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A	German	‘Jamaica’	coalition	will	hinder	Eurozone
reform,	but	make	little	difference	to	Brexit
Angela	Merkel	cannot	govern	alone.	John	Ryan	(LSE)	explores	the	difficult	task	she	faces	in
pulling	together	a	coalition,	which	will	probably	be	a	three-way	affair	between	the	CDU/CSU,
the	Greens	and	the	FDP	–	a	so-called	‘Jamaica’	coalition.	Emmanuel	Macron’s	plans	to	reform
the	Eurozone	are	likely	to	prove	a	flashpoint.	But	the	arrival	of	Merkel’s	governing	partners	is
unlikely	to	make	a	material	difference	to	Brexit.
Angela	Merkel’s	fourth	election	was	a	heavily	qualified	victory.	Opposition	to	the	chancellor’s
decision	to	let	in	more	than	a	million	refugees	is	more	widely	felt	in	Germany	than	the	election	coverage	reflected.
It	shows	not	only	in	the	rise	of	the	rightwing	Alternative	für	Deutschland	(AfD)	party,	but	also	in	the	flight	of	voters
from	Merkel’s	Bavarian	sister	party,	the	CSU.
Merkel	will	not	be	able	to	govern	alone.	The	FDP	and	Greens,	who	have	differing	views	on	Eurozone	reform	and
Brexit,	will	contribute	to	shaping	Berlin’s	Europe	policy	after	the	election.	An	unprecedented	seven	parties	were	in
line	to	have	seats	in	the	Bundestag:	the	four	smaller	parties	–	the	leftist	Die	Linke,	the	liberal	Free	Democrats
(FDP),	the	Greens	and	the	right	wing	AfD,	as	well	as	Merkel’s	conservative	Christian	Democrats	Union	(CDU)
and	her	Bavarian	allies	the	Christian	Social	Union	(CSU)	party	and	the	Social	Democrat	Party	(SPD).
An	FDP	placard	shows	Christian	Lindner,	who	is	likely	to	be	a	key	figure	in	a	‘Jamaica’	coalition.
Photo:	opposition24.de	via	a	CC	BY	2.0	licence.
In	the	pre-election	parliament,	the	CDU/CSU	and	the	SPD	held	80%	of	the	seats	in	the	Bundestag,	with	the
Greens	and	Die	Linke	holding	the	rest.	Before	the	election,	the	executive	was	strong	and	the	legislature	was
weak.	The	election	outcome	has	changed	that.
A	minority	government	is	an	outside	possibility	if	neither	the	Greens	nor	the	FDP	agree	to	a	coalition	with	the
CDU/CSU.	Merkel	could	also	form	a	minority	government	supported	by	all	three	(the	FDP,	the	Greens	and	the
SPD).	This	would	be	a	first	at	the	federal	level,	and	would	make	governing	a	lot	harder	for	her,	as	she	would	have
to	find	changing	majorities	for	her	policies.	In	times	of	crisis,	however,	she	would	probably	be	able	to	count	on	the
FDP,	the	Greens	and	the	SPD	to	back	her	–	as	the	SPD	did,	for	example,	during	the	Euro	crisis,	when	Merkel’s
black-yellow	coalition	at	the	time	failed	to	get	a	majority	for	the	second	Greek	bailout.	A	minority	government
would	allow	the	Greens,	the	SPD	and	also	the	FDP	to	maintain	an	independent	profile,	and	its	leaders	to	fight	the
CDU/CSU	from	the	opposition	benches	in	2021.
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A	three-way	‘Jamaica’	coalition	would	be	a	tense	affair
But	a	three-way	coalition	with	the	colours	of	the	Jamaican	flag	—	CDU/CSU,	FDP	and	Greens	–	is	the	most	likely
outcome.	Such	a	pact	has	existed	since	June	2017	in	the	Schleswig-Holstein	region.	Despite	their	origins	as	a
left-wing	environmentalist	party,	the	Greens	have	moved	increasingly	to	the	centre	of	Germany’s	political
landscape	and	have	become	a	realistic	coalition	partner	for	the	CDU/CSU.	However,	tensions	between	Merkel’s
Bavarian	ally	the	CSU	and	the	Greens	over	migration	policy	would	make	such	a	coalition	difficult.	Still,	if	Merkel
were	to	lead	such	a	Jamaica	coalition	it	would	show	how	far	the	Christian	Democrats	have	moved	to	the	centre,	if
not	to	the	centre	left,	under	her	leadership.
Yet	the	task	of	tempting	Greens,	Christian	Democrats,	out-of-sorts	Bavarians	and	pro-market	Free	Democrats
into	an	alliance	—	let	alone	keeping	them	there	—	looks	like	an	uphill	struggle.	Even	if	it	works,	the	resulting
Cabinet	tensions	will	be	massive.
The	FDP	has	resurrected	itself	in	the	election	at	federal	level	with	10.7%	under	the	guidance	of	its	leader,
Christian	Lindner.	Lindner’s	call	for	Greece	to	exit	the	Euro	appealed	to	some	CDU	voters	and	limited	his	party’s
possible	losses	to	the	AfD.	German	industry	–	which	has	poured	money	into	the	FDP	–	sees	it	as	worthy	of	ruling
once	again,	in	coalition	with	the	CDU/CSU	and	the	Greens.
The	Greens	received	only	8.7%	of	the	vote,	despite	several	environmental	scandals	this	summer	which	should
have	been	gifts	to	their	profile	and	vote	share.	The	party	has	always	been	divided	between	a	more	fundamentalist
left	wing	and	pragmatists	like	the	former	vice-chancellor	Joschka	Fischer,	who	helped	to	get	them	into	power.	But
they	managed	to	stay	united	for	the	sake	of	political	expedience.	However,	the	party	has	been	split	over	whether
to	become	a	sort	of	eco-CDU	(following	Winfried	Kretschmann,	the	party’s	most	successful	leader	and	only
Green	state	prime	minister	in	the	CDU’s	heartland,	Baden-Württemberg)	or	to	maintain	its	left-wing	credentials
and	remain	a	green	version	of	the	social	democrats.	A	coalition	with	Merkel	and	the	FDP	would	cement	the
party’s	shift	in	the	former	direction,	but	alienate	many	of	its	left-leaning	voters	and	members.	The	left	wing	of	the
Greens	would	probably	become	more	vocal	in	the	Jamaica	coalition	negotiations.
The	implications	for	Greece,	the	Eurozone	and	Brexit
A	coalition	between	the	CDU/CSU,	FDP	and	Greens	would	make	Eurozone	reform	less	likely.	It	would	push	the
CDU/CSU	to	double	down	on	its	calls	for	fiscal	discipline.	Lindner	has	claimed	the	finance	ministry	for	his	party	–
and	going	by	his	statements	in	the	election	campaign,	not	much	has	changed	in	the	FDP’s	tough	position	on
Greece.	(Finance	minister	Wolfgang	Schäuble’s	exit	could	make	it	more	likely	that	the	finance	ministry	will	go	to
the	FDP.)	Lindner	believes	Greece	should	exit	the	Eurozone,	though	without	losing	its	EU	membership.	He	made
clear	on	election	night	that	any	Eurozone	reform	that	entailed	major	fiscal	transfers	as	part	of	a	Eurozone	budget
and	cost	Germany	money	would	be	“a	line	in	the	sand”.
He	is	also	sceptical	about	French	plans	for	a	billion-euro	budget	for	the	Eurozone.	Emmanuel	Macron	wants	a
common	Eurozone	budget,	a	European	finance	minister	and	a	Eurozone	parliament,	and	he	thinks	Germany	and
the	EU	should	boost	investment.	The	CDU/CSU	are	also	doubtful	about	Macron’s	proposal	because	they	place	a
premium	on	sticking	to	the	Eurozone’s	fiscal	rules,	and	oppose	proposals	that	could	usher	in	debt	mutualisation.
Lindner	has	warned	that	there	should	be	no	“friendly	gifts”	to	France	that	threaten	European	stability.
The	Greens,	on	the	other	hand,	have	embraced	the	French	president’s	reform	proposals;	they	want	an	end	to
austerity	and	a	European	‘investment	offensive’.	Merkel,	meanwhile,	knows	that	Germany	and	France	need	to
work	together	closely	to	provide	the	leadership	Europe	needs.	Her	next	coalition	partner(s)	will	determine	whether
she	has	enough	leeway	to	compromise	with	the	French.
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So	when	Macron	proposed	deeper	Eurozone	integration	on	26	September	–	only	two	days	after	the	German
election	–	he	was	aware	his	words	would	be	scrutinised.	Even	before	the	German	federal	election,	Berlin	had
ruled	out	euro	bonds	(shared	borrowing	across	the	Eurozone).	Germany	also	puts	more	emphasis	on	enforcing
financial	rules	in	its	discussions	about	a	European	monetary	fund,	a	vehicle	to	replace	the	existing	bailout
mechanism.	Macron	acknowledged	these	concerns	in	his	speech,	saying	Eurozone	reform	was	“not	about
mutualising	our	past	debts	or	solving	the	financial	problems	of	one	country”.
In	a	defiant	message	to	the	FDP,	which	had	warned	of	“red	lines”	during	the	same	week,	Macron	said:	“I	don’t
have	red	lines,	I	only	have	horizons.”	He	was	nevertheless	cautious	on	Eurozone	reform,	reflecting	the	new
reality	after	the	German	elections.	The	European	commission	in	early	December	2017	will	publish	proposals	for	a
Eurozone	finance	minister	and	other	reforms.	EU	leaders	will	discuss	the	ideas	at	a	summit	later	that	month.
Meanwhile,	another	important	state	election	in	Lower	Saxony	is	due	on	15	October.	All	Merkel’s	potential	coalition
parties	will	try	to	avoid	being	seen	to	compromise	too	much,	because	this	might	impede	any	substantial	progress
in	coalition	talks.
The	ongoing	uncertainty	based	on	this	unruly	potential	four-party	coalition	means	there	will	be	limited	Eurozone
reform	and	renewed	tensions	with	France	and	Greece,	especially	if	it	is	forced	to	leave	the	Euro.	But	the	change
in	composition	of	a	Merkel	government	is	unlikely	to	have	a	material	impact	on	Brexit.	A	Jamaica	coalition	will
continue	the	efforts	to	avoid	a	hard	Brexit,	but	ultimately	–	it	is	important	for	the	UK	government	to	recognise	–	if
hard	decisions	have	to	be	made,	it	will	put	the	EU	first.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Professor	John	Ryan	is	a	Fellow	at	LSE	IDEAS.	He	was	a	fellow	at	St	Edmund’s	College,	University	of
Cambridge,	and	at	the	European	Integration	section	of	the	German	Institute	for	International	and	Security	Affairs,
Berlin.
Also	by	John	Ryan:
If	you	didn’t	laugh,	you’d	cry	…	Brexit	and	the	renaissance	of	British	humour
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